Bismillah al-Rahmān al-Rahim wa al-hamdu lillāhi Rabb al-Ālamin
Towards Political Engagement
Evaluating Hizbut-Tahrir's Theo-political Stance
- Part 1-
Maajid Nawaz
Towards Political Engagement
Evaluating Hizbut-Tahrir's Theo-political Stance
- Part 1-
Maajid Nawaz
The first in a series of articles reviewing Islamist political theory
Introduction:
As followers of Hizbut-Tahrir (The Liberation Party) are by now aware, after affiliation to the Party since I was 16, I took the painful yet vital step of resigning from its UK leadership committee and leaving the Party. Members of the Party are rightfully owed an explanation. Acting on the advice of my friends in the UK Party leadership I delayed issuing this explanation from fear that my words would be misconstrued by others. Thus, with Allāh as my witness, I have taken the decision to finally issue this article after much delay and thought in order to clarify my stance and attempt to open up a new chapter in the mindset of politically active Muslims. In the current climate, I can only emphasise that I do not wish my critical voice to be exploited to support the call for proscribing Hizbut-Tahrir. Rather, those that are well versed in both Party ideology and traditional Islamic sciences are sufficiently equipped and duty-bound to redress the phenomenon of politically inspired theological interpretations. I would also state that my political stance against the tragic invasion of Iraq remains unchanged. Furthermore, these words should not be taken to mean that I support the brutal policies of the Muslim world’s dictators, rather political engagement is the civic duty of all who are able. Finally, I impress upon all people that Islām today is not in need of a politically inspired modernist reformation, which is actually the cause of our current crisis, rather a counter-reformation and a return to its true essence by Muslims insisting that their religion is not used merely to serve narrow political agendas.
I spent much of my time as a political prisoner in Egypt (2002-2006) evaluating and studying traditional Islamic sciences. With the passing of time it became ever clearer to me that rather than being the sole vanguard that represents an Islām that even Muslim jurists have misunderstood, Hizbut-Tahrir is inspired by a political ideology super-imposed upon an Islamic legal analysis. In other words, today's world in the eyes of Hizbut-Tahrir is analysed through a prism of political Ijtihād (theological legal reasoning). Their political Ijtihād (pl. Ijtihādāt) is the basis for a revolutionary call to transform Muslim countries from what is deemed Dār al-Kufr (contra-Islamic land) to Dār al-Islām (Islamic lands) and from what are considered Kufr (contra-Islamic) states to a unitary 'Islamic state'. This task entails the forceful overthrow of all regimes in the Muslim world as they are judged to be ruling by Kufr laws thus they lack Shari'ah legitimacy, the final arbiter in legal disputes. Authority for this political stance is gained from citing religious scripture interpreted via the Party's principles of Islamic jurisprudence. As my understanding of Islām grew, however, I realised that the very scripture and principles used by the Party to make its analysis do not actually support its call. Rather, and quite distressingly for me at first, the Party's own principles result in the exact opposite conclusion. It is with this introduction that I embark upon demonstrating how the Party's own theological, intellectual and legal principles, when applied to their political conclusions, result only in the invalidity of Hizbut-Tahrir's political stance.
Hizbut-Tahrir on Dār al-Islām1
The Islamic and Contra-Islamic Lands:
Party members are obliged to believe that the whole world today is Dār al-Kufr (contra-Islamic land), synonymous in its literature to Dār al-harb (land of war)2.
“These lands in which Muslims currently live throughout the world, their reality is that they are all Dār al-Kufr and not Dār al-Islām.”3
The Party leadership then stipulated two conditions for Dār al-Islām:
a) The land must be “governed by the laws of Islām.”4
b) “Security (Amān 5) is maintained by the security of Islām ie: by the authority and protection of Muslims inside and outside the land, even if the majority of its inhabitants are non-Muslims”.6
Dār al-Kufr is conversely defined as the land
“…governed by the laws of Kufr, and whose security is not maintained by the security (Amān) of Islām ie: by other than the authority and security of Muslims, even if the majority of its inhabitants are Muslims.”7
Proof for these two conditions is asserted rationally and with various Koranic verses and hadith narrations brought forward to support each condition. After listing evidence to demonstrate that the appearance of Kufr laws is sufficient to negate the first condition of Dār al-Islām, it is stated,
“So these texts indicate that to rule with anything other than the laws of Allāh is a matter which makes it obligatory upon Muslims to declare war against the ruler, and it is an evidence which indicates that implementing Islām is a condition for having Dār al-Islām, otherwise the ruler must be fought against.”8
Therefore, Party theory holds that there can be no 'Islamic State' without firstly the land being Dār al-Islām by these two conditions. The Party accepts, however, that security of Muslim lands is in the hands of Muslims. It is only by the absence of the first condition of ruling by Islām, therefore, that the lands are deemed Dār al-Kufr,
“...it is evident that all the current Muslim lands do not fulfil the condition of the laws of Islām. Though the security (Amān) of most of them is maintained by the security and authority of Muslims.”9
The land being Dār al-Islām, however, is not synonymous in Party literature to the regimes being Islamic. This is because a scenario is envisaged where a land may be Dār al-Islām, but then the ruler begins initiating what are considered Kufr laws. The Party believes that only in such circumstances are the people obliged to fight the ruler,
“The aim in the current situation is not to change a ruler who rules by Kufr in Dār al-Islām; the aim is rather to change the whole of Dār al-Kufr, including its thoughts and systems...If in Dār al-Islām, which is ruled according to the revelation of Allāh (swt), its ruler ruled with clear Kufr then the Muslims must forbid it, so that he reverts back to ruling according to Islām. In case he doesn't repent, it becomes imperative upon the Muslims to take up arms against him to force him to revert to ruling with the revelation of Allāh (swt).”10
Today, the world is believed by the Party to be Dār al-Kufr in origin due to the unprecedented move by Mustafa Kemal in dismantling the Ottoman Caliphate after the First World War, and colonialist occupation of other Muslim lands, eventually giving rise to client regimes. Therefore, fighting to remove today's rulers “who rule by Kufr” is deemed by the Party as being based on a misunderstanding of the reality and its Shari'ah rule, as such action only applies to rulers who initiate Kufr laws within an existent Dār al-Islām, whereas today the Muslims lands are already Dār al-Kufr.
Rather, the Party draws an analogy to the Prophet's (peace be upon him) own life in Dār al-Kufr, Mecca, up until he gained authority in Yathrib (later named Madinah) making it Dār al-Islām. The Prophet (peace be upon him) is perceived by the Party to have engaged in a purely political and intellectual mission to remove the Kufr system in place, until he (peace be upon him) amassed enough support from the military tribes of Yathrib that he “orchestrated a coup d'etat”11 removing the powerless king-to-be in Yathrib, 'Ubay ibn Sulūl. This interpretation is then used by the Party to call the military or other forces of power in Muslim countries (named in Party terminology the Nuşrah12, or material support) to remove illegitimate regimes by force in a coup d'etat.
“(This would) normally be done by the Party seeking to access the military in order to take the authority...After this the military would be capable of establishing the authority of Islām. Hence a coup d'etat would be the manifestation of a political change...”13
Therefore, the Muslim world being Dār al-Kufr is axiomatic to the Party's analysis. The aim being one of changing Dār al-Kufr to Dār al-Islām. It serves as their adopted legal premise to take from the early life of the Prophet (peace be upon him) the Party's method of intellectual and political struggle culminating in seeking a military coup. On the other hand, if the Muslim world was Dār al-Islām then, according to the Party's stance, the appearance of Kufr would simply oblige armed insurrection directly against the rulers.
“Announcing war against him (the ruler) if clear disbelief (Kufr Buwah) is seen from him after he was ruling by Islām is obligatory and it is religiously forbidden (harām) to refrain from performing it.”14
“But the duty to raise arms against the ruler and to fight against him if he showed clear Kufr, this applies only if the land (Dār) is Dār al-Islām, and the rules of Islām were implemented and the ruler subsequently showed open Kufr.”15
Consequently, it is crucial for the Party to insist that Muslim lands are Dār al-Kufr. If they hypothetically accepted that Muslim lands are Dār al-Islām yet still coupled this with their insistence that the states are ruling by Kufr they would only give credence (by their own principles) to the Jihadist16 methodology of armed insurrection and assassinating the ruler.
Hizbut-Tahrir's inconsistency in enacting its Ijtihād that all Muslim lands are Dār al-Kufr
Hizbut-Tahrir use the theory I have outlined above to advocate the theological illegitimacy of contemporary Muslim regimes, and therefore the religious obligation on each and every Muslim to overthrow them17 in a pre-defined strategic order18. The flaw here, however, is astoundingly obvious for any trained practitioner of Shari'ah law yet amazingly, and despite being the view of today's Islamic jurists, has not yet been popularised. Perhaps that is due to no one fully understanding what it is that Hizbut-Tahrir actually believe.
If it can be demonstrated that the Party’s theory is nothing but a legal opinion (Ijtihād), then the argument that opposing views are based on Kufr becomes unsustainable. According to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (Usūl al-Fiqh), and even according to the Party's own ideas, any legal opinion (Ijtihād) is by definition inconclusive (Zanni) and thus non-binding on those who follow opposing legal opinions (Ijtihādāt). Consequently, using an opinion (Ijtihād) to enforce a conclusion of Kufr upon others by force is a contradiction in terms within Islamic jurisprudence, not to mention Party ideology. At best it is Wahhabite, and at worst it is the cynical use of Islām to justify what is essentially a political ideology.
Principles elucidated within the Party's own culturing process via their adopted books hold that legal opinions (Ijtihādāt) are insufficient for producing judgements of religious deviancy (Bid'ah) against opposing legal opinions (Ijtihādāt), not to mention Kufr.
“...the strength of the evidence is only according to the one who educed (Mustadill) it. Even if the manner which he educed it was his own and the definition was his own, as long as he relied on the semblance of an evidence (Shubha al-Dalil). This is because how the strength of the evidence is perceived differs from people to people due to their disparate perceptions of the Shari'ah evidence itself and due to the manner which they understand the Arabic language and the Shari'ah.”19
This is, in fact, one of the main arguments Party followers advance against their Wahhabite agitators when defending themselves against the latter's accusations of religious unorthodoxy. The Party holds that its followers are obliged to condemn misconduct (Munkar), as defined by their interpretation, whether it be Bid’ah or Kufr. However, a misconduct (Munkar) can only occur if the perpetrator is not following an opposing jurist’s Ijtihād. If, however, they are following a jurist on a legal opinion (Ijtihād) then they are absolved of sin and no misconduct (Munkar) has occurred even if their action is contrary to the Party’s own view. Rather, the mistake of the jurist in his legal judgement still gains divine favour. The only time a view is not recognised is if it runs contrary to conclusive (Qati’i) injunctions, as is mentioned in Party books,
“The jurist (Mujtahid) exerts his utmost effort to derive the rule. If he is correct in his exertion (Ijtihād) then he has two rewards and if he makes a mistake he will have one....The Companions of the Prophet upon whom be peace (Sahābah) have formed a legally binding consensus (Ijmā') that the jurist (Mujtahid) is not accountable in the Shari'ah rules regarding speculative jurisprudence (Fiqhi) issues...That is why the Companions (Sahābah) disagreed on speculative issues but never on the definite (Qati'i) issues. Concerning speculative issues the jurist (Mujtahid) is correct in what he has arrived at by his legal exertion (Ijtihād) even if he is liable to make a mistake in his opinion. However, being correct does not mean that he has hit the target because this does not agree with the reality of a speculative rule since the Messenger (saw) considered him mistaken (Mukhti'). What is meant by saying that the jurist (Mujtahid) is right is in terms that do not rule out the possibility of making mistakes and not in terms of hitting the true target (Isāba) which is contrary to mistake. Describing someone who makes a mistake in legal exertion (Ijtihād) as right (Musib) is in the meaning that the text rewards [sic] the jurist (Mujtahid) even when he makes a mistake and not in the sense that he did not make a mistake. Therefore, every jurist (Mujtahid) is right according to what he thinks is right but this does not rule out the chance that a mistake could have been made.“20
Therefore, if it can be illustrated that a) the classifications of Dār al-Islām and Dār al-Kufr are not conclusive (Qati’i), and b) that classical jurists held opposing yet valid criteria for the definition of Dār al-Islām; then those criteria would suffice in forcing the Party to accept that Muslim lands are not conclusively Dār al-Kufr, but are only so in their subjective legal opinion (Ijtihād). Any subjective legal judgement would then be bound to recognise the validity of, though not agree with, the opposing view. As such, no Kufr would exist and no misconduct (Munkar) would have occurred to remove. Instead, a wrong, but valid and divinely praised legal opinion (Ijtihād) would exist in its place. Those who fully appreciate both Party and Islamic jurisprudential thinking will grasp the importance of the point here. If there is no misconduct (Munkar), but only a wrong yet legally valid opinion (Ijtihād), then according to Party ideology and Islamic jurisprudence, this Ijtihād is an Islamic opinion, and not Kufr. Thus, it is an Islamic opinion that Muslim lands are Dār al-Islām. It is also an Islamic opinion therefore, that Muslim lands hold theological legitimacy. Moreover, if the Party insists on not recognising opposing legal opinions (Ijtihādāt) on this matter then theirs is the theologically illegitimate stance. When two opposing Islamic opinions clash, both are bound to recognise, though not agree with, the validity of the other. Consequently, once the existence of an alternative view is substantiated, the Party is theologically bound to recognise the validity of Muslim lands being Dār al-Islām,
“This is because difference of opinion in deduction between the scholars does not make the rule legitimate before a Mujtahid and illegitimate before another. Rather it is a Shari’ah rule before all Muslims as long as there is (even) an obscure evidence (Shubha al-Dalil) from the Shar’iah evidences before the deducer of the rule, and it is possible according to the linguistic and Shari'ah knowledge (Ma’ārif) that one can deduce this type of deduction.”21
All that remains, therefore, is to demonstrate how Hizbut-Tahrir's judgement on Muslim lands being Dār al-Kufr is not Qati'i, but rather is an inconclusive legal reasoning (Ijtihād Zanni). Upon comprehending the significance of this point one can understand why the Party's second global leader, the late Sheikh Abdul Qadeem Zalloom22 insisted that this matter was closed to debate and absolutely decisive,
“The reality of Muslims today is sensed by every Muslim; it does not require any explanation nor does it necessitate any elaboration. Their lands are ruled by Kufr systems, thus they are conclusively (Qat'an) Dār al-Kufr [with no debate!].”23
Proving that Judgements on the Land (Dār) are at Best Inconclusive (Zanni)
The first and most obvious way of demonstrating the inconclusive nature of Hizbut-Tahrir's stance, and thus the theological illegitimacy of enforcing their view that others are on Kufr, is by identifying the source of the terms used. Definitions of Dār al-Kufr and Dār al-Islām are not to be found in any verse of the Qur'ān or any hadith (prophetic traditions). One or two prophetic traditions (Ahadith), argued by many to be of weak authenticity, refer to the term Dār al-harb and another refers to Dār al-Kufr, but all fail to offer any definition of these terms. It is primarily due to this reason that the definitions are vastly differed over by the Jurists (Mujtahidin) as each one simply extracted what seemed plausible to him from scripture (see below). Consequently, even the very need for a definition, not to mention the definition itself, is an opinion (Ijtihād).
A second way of proving that the Party's definitions are inconclusive (Zanni) is by considering the scriptural citations used to arrive at them.24 The two passages (Ayāt) from the Qur'ān that are referred to, though in themselves forming a theologically definitive source for proof (Qati'i al-Thubūt), their link to this particular subject matter as conditions (Shart) for the validity of a land (Dār) is inconclusive (Zanni). As for the prophetic traditions (Ahādith) used by the Party to define these terms they form an inconclusive source (Zanni al-Thubūt) for proof as they are singularly narrated traditions (Khabr Al-Āhād). Such traditions are inconclusive according to the Party's own view and no matter what rule (hukm) is derived from them it can only but be inconclusive (Zanni),
“If the speech of the Legislator is inconclusive as a source (Zanniy al-Thubūt), such as non-Mutawātir Ahādith25, then the rule (hukm) included will not be conclusive, regardless of whether the meaning is conclusive (Qat’iy al-Dalālah) or not.”26
Thirdly, and astonishingly, the Party explicitly accepts that these terms are subject to valid legal differences (Ikhtilāf Shari'i) in the very area that the Party was founded to redress, i.e.: concerning how Dār al-Islām becomes Dār al-Kufr,
“Similarly there is no disagreement that the land of Islām (Dār al-Islām) is the land that submits to the rule of Islām and is ruled by Muslims...however they differed as to what changes Dār al- Islām into Dār al-Kufr. Some jurists (Mujtahidin) said that Dār al-Islām does not become a Dār al-Kufr except by three conditions: firstly, the appearance of the rules of Kufr in it. Secondly, that it is bordering Dār al-Kufr. Thirdly, that there does not remain in it any Muslim or non- Muslim under a covenant (Zimmi) secured by the first security (Amān) which is the security of Muslims.”27
The implications of admitting a valid difference on this opinion in an adopted book of the Party are huge28. According to this valid Islamic opinion most of the lands today considered by the Party to have become Dār al-Kufr, are still Dār al-Islām, and those who judge Muslim lands today using this legitimate opinion are perfectly within their rights to insist that Muslim societies and their systems are not in lands of Kufr. Moreover, the Party is bound to recognise their opinion as Islamic not Kufr, though not agreeing with it. Thus, by enforcing its opinion upon society that the Muslim world is Dār al-Kufr the Party is condemning something that is not a 'misconduct' (Munkar).
The author in the above citation is quite hostile to such an opinion and asserts that it has no basis in evidence, despite the Party stating in volume one of the same book,
“...the strength of the evidence is only according to the one who educed it. Even if the manner which he educed it was his own and the definition was his own, as long as he relied on the semblance of an evidence (Shubha al-Dalil). This is because how the strength of the evidence is perceived differs from people to people due to their disparate perceptions of the Shari'ah evidence itself ...”29
In this case the opinion referred to happens to belong to the foremost jurist (Mujtahid) and lawyer (Faqih) of Sunni Muslims (Ahl al-Sunnah), none other than the founder of the first school of Sunni law, Imām Abū hanifah himself30.
The Party, by making its inconclusive (Zanni) judgement that the world is Dār al-Kufr a basis for the illegitimacy of Muslim lands, is inherently contradictory. On the one hand, the Party accepts any legal opinion (Ijtihād) based upon a semblance of an evidence (Shubha al-Dalil) as valid, yet on the other, it refuses to tolerate the Islamic opinion that Muslim lands today are Dār al-Islām.
Quotations of Early Muslim Jurists and Lawyers (Mujtahidin and Fuqahā)31:
A fourth way to demonstrate this point is simply by listing the various views of past jurists and lawyers (Mujtahidin and Fuqahā), so as to demonstrate the sheer breadth of disagreement on this point. The views are categorised by school of thought,
The Shāfi'i school:
al-Imām al-Rāfi'i, second to none but al-Imām al-Nawawi in the Shāfi'i hierarchy states,
“It is not conditional to Dār al-Islām that Muslims reside there, rather being in the hands of the Imām and his Islām is sufficient.”32
al-Imām al-Māwardi, author of the influential 'Rules of Governance' (Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah) sourced heavily by the Party, believed,
“If it becomes possible to manifest ones religion (Din) in any Kufr land, then that land becomes by such a virtue Dār al-Islām. Therefore, residence therein is better than leaving due to the hope that others will embrace Islām.”33
Al-Imām al-Bujayrimī, a reliable (Mu'tamad) source of Shāfi’ī jurisprudence (Fiqh) maintains that Dār al-Islām for the Shāfi’ī's can be a place where Muslims reside even if there are Ahl al-Zimma (non-Muslims of the covenant) present, and further, even if non-Muslims were granted the right by Muslims to govern over it.
"On Dār al-Islām: meaning, that Muslims reside there, even if there were ahl al-zimma (non Muslims of the covenant) present, or it was conquered by Muslims who then agreed that non- Muslims would govern over it (Wa Aqarrūha bi Yad il-Kuffār), or they were living there and were expelled by the disbelievers from it."
"...And the Shāfi'ī's said: it (Dār al-Islām) is the entire land where Islamic rulings (Ahkām al- Islām) appear, and it is intended by the phrase 'appearance of the Islamic rulings', every one of its rulings; or Muslims live there even if there were Ahl al-Zimma (non-Muslims of the covenant) present with them; or it was conquered by Muslims who then agreed that non-Muslims would govern over it (Wa Aqarrūha bi Yad il-Kuffār); or they were living there and were expelled by the disbelievers from it".34
al-Imām al-Ba'lawi considers that,
“Any place at which a resident Muslim is capable of defending himself against hostile forces for a period of time is Dār al-Islām, where his judgments can be applied at that time and those times following it.”35
al-Imām al-Ba'lawi considers that,
“Any place at which a resident Muslim is capable of defending himself against hostile forces for a period of time is Dār al-Islām, where his judgments can be applied at that time and those times following it.”35
The Hanafi school :
Shams al-A'immah al-Sarakhsi, the source for hanafi jurisprudence, defines it as
“A place which is under the authority or ownership of Muslims and the proof is that Muslims are secure therein.”36
Al-Kāsāni states,
“There is no difference between our companions (the hanafi's) that Dār al-Kufr becomes Dār al- Islām due to the appearance (Zuhūr) of the rulings (Ahkām) of Islām therein.”37
The Judge (al-Qādi) Abū Yūsuf believed,
“The land is considered Dār al-Islām by the appearance (Zuhūr) of the rulings (Ahkām) of Islām therein even if the majority of its people where disbelievers, and it is considered Dār al-Kufr for the appearance of the rulings (Ahkām) of Kufr therein even if the majority of its people were Muslims” 38
However, it is incorrect to assume that al-Kāsāni's and Abū Yūsuf's reference to the 'appearance of the rulings of Islām' implies an absolutist interpretation towards implementing the Shari'ah on a state level as law, rather than merely safety to manifest such rulings. This is because a further analysis reveals that the concern of hanafi jurists was actually the safety to individually manifest such rulings. Ibn ‘Ābidin, an expert hanafi jurist stated,
“Indeed, Dār al-harb becomes Dār al-Islām by establishing the rulings (Ahkām) of Islām such as the Friday prayer and the 'Eid prayer; even if the indigenous non-Muslims remain therein and that country is not adjoined to Dār al-Islām.”39
Moreover, al-Kāsāni' himself, citing the founder of their school Abū hanifah as a source, completes his above quotation with the words,
“Prefixing the word 'Islām' to a land, and likewise the word 'Kufr', isn't actually intending Islām itself nor Kufr itself, but rather it is a matter of security and fear. This means that if there is absolute safety for Muslims it is Dār al-Islām… and if there is absolute fear for Muslims and absolute safety for non-Muslims then it is Dār al-harb.”40
In fact, Abū hanifa maintains that countries that have treaties with Muslim lands automatically become Dār al-Islām due to the safety ensuing therefrom.41
Consequently, it is clear that what the hanafi's meant by “the appearance of the rulings of Islam” was exactly that, their “appearance” in the practice of individuals throughout society, with the general safety and security provided to practice Islamic rituals, and not state laws per se.
This clarification highlights two points: firstly, that the hanafi definition is the same as the two Shāfi'is', al-Imām al-Māwardi and al-Imām al-Bujayrimi', entailing the right to live as Muslims in the land. Thus, as al-Sheikh Muhammad al-hamid also believed, it is generally agreed amongst this group that Dār al-harb becomes Dār al-Islām once the practice of Shari'ah is permitted in day to day life.42 Secondly, that the Party definition of the land being “governed by the laws of Islam” is an innovation and, contrary to popular belief within the Party, is not the same as the hanafi definition.
Shams al-A'immah al-Sarakhsi, the source for hanafi jurisprudence, defines it as
“A place which is under the authority or ownership of Muslims and the proof is that Muslims are secure therein.”36
Al-Kāsāni states,
“There is no difference between our companions (the hanafi's) that Dār al-Kufr becomes Dār al- Islām due to the appearance (Zuhūr) of the rulings (Ahkām) of Islām therein.”37
The Judge (al-Qādi) Abū Yūsuf believed,
“The land is considered Dār al-Islām by the appearance (Zuhūr) of the rulings (Ahkām) of Islām therein even if the majority of its people where disbelievers, and it is considered Dār al-Kufr for the appearance of the rulings (Ahkām) of Kufr therein even if the majority of its people were Muslims” 38
However, it is incorrect to assume that al-Kāsāni's and Abū Yūsuf's reference to the 'appearance of the rulings of Islām' implies an absolutist interpretation towards implementing the Shari'ah on a state level as law, rather than merely safety to manifest such rulings. This is because a further analysis reveals that the concern of hanafi jurists was actually the safety to individually manifest such rulings. Ibn ‘Ābidin, an expert hanafi jurist stated,
“Indeed, Dār al-harb becomes Dār al-Islām by establishing the rulings (Ahkām) of Islām such as the Friday prayer and the 'Eid prayer; even if the indigenous non-Muslims remain therein and that country is not adjoined to Dār al-Islām.”39
Moreover, al-Kāsāni' himself, citing the founder of their school Abū hanifah as a source, completes his above quotation with the words,
“Prefixing the word 'Islām' to a land, and likewise the word 'Kufr', isn't actually intending Islām itself nor Kufr itself, but rather it is a matter of security and fear. This means that if there is absolute safety for Muslims it is Dār al-Islām… and if there is absolute fear for Muslims and absolute safety for non-Muslims then it is Dār al-harb.”40
In fact, Abū hanifa maintains that countries that have treaties with Muslim lands automatically become Dār al-Islām due to the safety ensuing therefrom.41
Consequently, it is clear that what the hanafi's meant by “the appearance of the rulings of Islam” was exactly that, their “appearance” in the practice of individuals throughout society, with the general safety and security provided to practice Islamic rituals, and not state laws per se.
This clarification highlights two points: firstly, that the hanafi definition is the same as the two Shāfi'is', al-Imām al-Māwardi and al-Imām al-Bujayrimi', entailing the right to live as Muslims in the land. Thus, as al-Sheikh Muhammad al-hamid also believed, it is generally agreed amongst this group that Dār al-harb becomes Dār al-Islām once the practice of Shari'ah is permitted in day to day life.42 Secondly, that the Party definition of the land being “governed by the laws of Islam” is an innovation and, contrary to popular belief within the Party, is not the same as the hanafi definition.
The Maliki school:
The Maliki reference point in jurisprudential matters, al-Dusūqi, states,
“a land in which the insignia of Islām (Sha'ā'ir43) are present”44
The Maliki reference point in jurisprudential matters, al-Dusūqi, states,
“a land in which the insignia of Islām (Sha'ā'ir43) are present”44
The Hanbali school:
Ibn Muflih writes that Dār al-Islām is every place where the rulings of Muslims are predominant.45
Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah maintains that,
“Dār al-Islām is the land upon where Muslims descended and upon where the rulings of Islām were executed. Any land upon where the rulings of Islām were not executed was not Dār al- Islām.”46
Finally, Ibn Hazm the main source for Zāhiri jurisprudence states,
“Because the land (Dār) is associated to the person dominant over it, its ruler and its king.”47
Based upon the above, one can summarise the early jurists' views on Dār al-Islām into two broad areas,
i) Those who consider that ownership and security must be in the hands of a Muslim ruler;
ii) And those who consider residence and manifesting the insignia of Islam (Sha'ā'ir) as sufficient to classify a place as Dār al-Islām.
Early Jurists differing over how a land becomes Dār al-Kufr after having been Dār al-Islām
The issue differs however when considering the change of land from having once been Dār al-Islām to becoming Dār al-Kufr. Here, even those who stipulated the condition that the rulings of Islām had to have been present did not necessarily put this condition for when the land changes to Dār al-Kufr. This is the very area that Hizbut-Tahrir's second global leader, Sheikh Abdul Qadeem Zalloom48 claimed is so clear cut that no debate is needed. There are, however, roughly four views on this point,
1) Lands that have been deemed Dār al-Islām continue to remain so, and do not become after that Dār al-harb or Dār al-Kufr. This view has been ascribed to some of the Shāfi'i's and the apparent meaning from the words of the Imāmiyyah school.49
2) Dār al-Islām becomes Dār al-Kufr by the appearance of Kufr therein or by its occupation by disbelievers (Kuffār). This is the view of al-Qādi Abū Yūsuf and al-Imām Muhammad al-Shaybāni (Abū hanifah's two disciples), the Hanbali's and some of the Zaydi's and Mutazilites.50
3) Dār al-Islām does not become Dār al-Kufr merely by the appearance of Kufr as long as its inhabitants are Muslims who are able to survive therein, defend their religion (Din) and establish some of the insignias (Sha'ā'ir) of Islām such as the call to prayer (Azan), Friday prayers, congregational prayers and 'Eid. This is the view of the Malikis and some latter day jurists from the Shāfi'is and Ibadites.51
Here, and before moving to the next view, we make mention of the Fatwa52 of al-Imām al-Ramli, the Shāfi'i jurist, concerning the people of 'Aragon' in Andalusia who sent him a query after the fall of their town to the Franks. Al-Imām al-Ramli was asked concerning resident Muslims under the protection of a Christian Sultan who usurped power over them and taxed their land. He did not oppress them or abuse their money or persons. They had mosques in which to pray, they could manifest Islamic insignia (Sha'ā'ir) and they could establish the Shari'ah of God openly. Did they have to perform the emigration (Hijrah) or not? Al-Imām al-Ramli answered that the emigration (Hijrah) from their land was not obligatory due to their ability to manifest their religion (Din) there and because the Prophet (peace be upon him) sent 'Uthmān on the day of hudaybiya to Mecca because there he was able to manifest his religion (Din)...On the contrary, it is not permitted to emigrate because it is hoped by their stay that others will become Muslims. Also, because it is Dār al-Islām and if they left it the land would become Dār al-harb (synonymous to Dār al-Kufr).53
4) Finally, Dār al-Islām does not become Dār al-Kufr except by three conditions:
i) The appearance of the rulings of Kufr therein
ii) Whilst it is neighbouring Dār al-harb in such a way that there is no other Dār al-Islām between them.
iii) That no Muslim or non-Muslim under a covenant (Zimmi) remains safe with the first security that the guardians of Muslims established therein.
As has already been stated above, this view is explicitly recognised by the Party in its books and is the view of al-Imām abū hanifah54 and some of the Zaydis. Al-Imām abū Zahra also narrates this view from al-Imām abū hanifa and adds one more condition, namely that the army or authority no longer remains under the control of the Muslim ruler.55 Al-Imām ibn 'Abidin, a hanafi jurist, states that it is clear from this that if the rulings of Islām and the rulings of Kufr were implemented together the land does not become Dār al-harb.56 This view rather gives preference to the security and safety of citizens as is elaborated by al-Sheikh Muhammad al-Hamid,
“As for the Fatwa’s claim that India is Dār al-harb it is not in its generality true. Because areas where Muslims reside and there is a remnant of Islām’s rules - even if this is limited to marriages and what pertains to them, for example - are considered Dār al-Islām. Dār al-Islām does not become Dār al-harb except under three conditions, (a) that the security of Muslims through their leader no longer exists, and the security of non-Muslims has taken its place; (b) that they have been surrounded from all sides such that it is impossible for the aid of Muslims to reach them; (c) and then not a single one of Islām’s rule remains therein.”57
Ibn Muflih writes that Dār al-Islām is every place where the rulings of Muslims are predominant.45
Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah maintains that,
“Dār al-Islām is the land upon where Muslims descended and upon where the rulings of Islām were executed. Any land upon where the rulings of Islām were not executed was not Dār al- Islām.”46
Finally, Ibn Hazm the main source for Zāhiri jurisprudence states,
“Because the land (Dār) is associated to the person dominant over it, its ruler and its king.”47
Based upon the above, one can summarise the early jurists' views on Dār al-Islām into two broad areas,
i) Those who consider that ownership and security must be in the hands of a Muslim ruler;
ii) And those who consider residence and manifesting the insignia of Islam (Sha'ā'ir) as sufficient to classify a place as Dār al-Islām.
Early Jurists differing over how a land becomes Dār al-Kufr after having been Dār al-Islām
The issue differs however when considering the change of land from having once been Dār al-Islām to becoming Dār al-Kufr. Here, even those who stipulated the condition that the rulings of Islām had to have been present did not necessarily put this condition for when the land changes to Dār al-Kufr. This is the very area that Hizbut-Tahrir's second global leader, Sheikh Abdul Qadeem Zalloom48 claimed is so clear cut that no debate is needed. There are, however, roughly four views on this point,
1) Lands that have been deemed Dār al-Islām continue to remain so, and do not become after that Dār al-harb or Dār al-Kufr. This view has been ascribed to some of the Shāfi'i's and the apparent meaning from the words of the Imāmiyyah school.49
2) Dār al-Islām becomes Dār al-Kufr by the appearance of Kufr therein or by its occupation by disbelievers (Kuffār). This is the view of al-Qādi Abū Yūsuf and al-Imām Muhammad al-Shaybāni (Abū hanifah's two disciples), the Hanbali's and some of the Zaydi's and Mutazilites.50
3) Dār al-Islām does not become Dār al-Kufr merely by the appearance of Kufr as long as its inhabitants are Muslims who are able to survive therein, defend their religion (Din) and establish some of the insignias (Sha'ā'ir) of Islām such as the call to prayer (Azan), Friday prayers, congregational prayers and 'Eid. This is the view of the Malikis and some latter day jurists from the Shāfi'is and Ibadites.51
Here, and before moving to the next view, we make mention of the Fatwa52 of al-Imām al-Ramli, the Shāfi'i jurist, concerning the people of 'Aragon' in Andalusia who sent him a query after the fall of their town to the Franks. Al-Imām al-Ramli was asked concerning resident Muslims under the protection of a Christian Sultan who usurped power over them and taxed their land. He did not oppress them or abuse their money or persons. They had mosques in which to pray, they could manifest Islamic insignia (Sha'ā'ir) and they could establish the Shari'ah of God openly. Did they have to perform the emigration (Hijrah) or not? Al-Imām al-Ramli answered that the emigration (Hijrah) from their land was not obligatory due to their ability to manifest their religion (Din) there and because the Prophet (peace be upon him) sent 'Uthmān on the day of hudaybiya to Mecca because there he was able to manifest his religion (Din)...On the contrary, it is not permitted to emigrate because it is hoped by their stay that others will become Muslims. Also, because it is Dār al-Islām and if they left it the land would become Dār al-harb (synonymous to Dār al-Kufr).53
4) Finally, Dār al-Islām does not become Dār al-Kufr except by three conditions:
i) The appearance of the rulings of Kufr therein
ii) Whilst it is neighbouring Dār al-harb in such a way that there is no other Dār al-Islām between them.
iii) That no Muslim or non-Muslim under a covenant (Zimmi) remains safe with the first security that the guardians of Muslims established therein.
As has already been stated above, this view is explicitly recognised by the Party in its books and is the view of al-Imām abū hanifah54 and some of the Zaydis. Al-Imām abū Zahra also narrates this view from al-Imām abū hanifa and adds one more condition, namely that the army or authority no longer remains under the control of the Muslim ruler.55 Al-Imām ibn 'Abidin, a hanafi jurist, states that it is clear from this that if the rulings of Islām and the rulings of Kufr were implemented together the land does not become Dār al-harb.56 This view rather gives preference to the security and safety of citizens as is elaborated by al-Sheikh Muhammad al-Hamid,
“As for the Fatwa’s claim that India is Dār al-harb it is not in its generality true. Because areas where Muslims reside and there is a remnant of Islām’s rules - even if this is limited to marriages and what pertains to them, for example - are considered Dār al-Islām. Dār al-Islām does not become Dār al-harb except under three conditions, (a) that the security of Muslims through their leader no longer exists, and the security of non-Muslims has taken its place; (b) that they have been surrounded from all sides such that it is impossible for the aid of Muslims to reach them; (c) and then not a single one of Islām’s rule remains therein.”57
The Opinions of Some Contemporary Islamic Lawyers Regarding Dār al-Islām and Dār al-Kufr:
Sheikh Muhammad al-'Afifi quotes in his Fatwa, Defending the Transgressed by Censuring the Reckless against the Killing of Civilians regarding a Shafi’i definition of Dār al-Islām,
“…Muslim scholars have classified the territories in this world into: Dār al-Islām [its synonyms
Bilād al-Islām or Dawla Islāmiyya; a Muslim state or territory or land or country, etc.] and Dār al-Kufr [a non-Muslim state, territory, etc.] The definition of a Muslim state is: “Any place at which a resident Muslim is capable of defending himself against hostile forces for a period of time is a Muslim state, where his judgments can be applied at that time and those times following it.”58 59
Sheikh Muhammad al-'Afifi then comments,
“By definition, an area is a Muslim state as long as Muslims continue to live there and the political and executive authority is Muslim. (Think about this, for the Muslims lands are many, varied, wide and extensive; and how poor and of limited insight are those who have tried to limit the definition of what a Muslim state must be, and whether realising it or not thus try to shrink the Muslim world).”60
After discussing the issue of Dār al-Islām and Dār al-harb Sheikh Nūh Keller writes, quoting from his Sheikh, Nūh ‘Ali Salman, regarding Dār al-harb,
“…which effectively means that none of the lands that Islām has spread to and in which something of it remains can be considered an enemy land.”61
What has been quoted above, from early and contemporary scholars, is by no means exhaustive. Nevertheless it provides ample evidence to substantiate the claim that the definitions are widely differed over. Preference is not expressed here for one definition over another as that is not the subject of this article. Rather, the aim is to show that Hizbut-Tahrir is bound, by virtue of its own ideas, to recognise that the lands today are Dār al-Islām because those who believe that they are have abundant scholarly material to rely upon. The Party may not agree with their definition, in fact it may still believe that the lands are Dār al-Kufr but what it cannot do (by its own principles) is enforce its view upon Muslims by force and condemn the lands today as Dār al-Kufr when other and valid Islamic definitions consider it Dār al-Islām.
This debate is absolutely not one of semantics. In considering this matter one should reflect upon why jurists of the past entered this discussion. Jurists deemed it necessary to define Dār al-Islām for the purpose of settling whether emigration (Hijra) was obligatory from that land, i.e. whether Muslims could live there in peace and security as long as they could practice their religion in such lands, or whether the obstacles to the practice of the religion would need to be removed through fighting (Jihād) (for a discussion of this issue related to the Hijra see, Ibn Rushd Senior (d. 520/1122), Al-Muqaddimat, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, N.d.), 1:374 {on the margins of al-Mudawannah al-kubrā}).
If Hijra was considered necessary it meant that there were obstacles to the Islamic call (Da'wah) in such a land as it would not allow the practice of Islamic worship ('Ibadāt). Here, historically, the Muslims' state would begin Jihād to remove such obstacles to the practice of the religion, and once that was done the land was deemed Dār al-Islām.
In the absence of the need for Hijrah, (i.e. when the land is Dār al-Islām because Muslims were allowed to practice their religion in peace and security), Muslims were commanded not to invade because they would hear the call to prayer (Azān) i.e. the inhabitants of such a land were not to be fought because they allowed Muslims to manifest the insignia (Sha'ā'ir) of Islam. This is clearly demonstrated in Prophetic Hadīth literature. It was narrated by Anas (r.a.) that:
“Wherever the Prophet, upon him be peace, raided some people he would not raid except in the morning. If he heard the call to prayer (Azān) he would refrain [from raiding], if he did not he would invade after dawn.”
Moreover, al-Muzny reported that the Prophet, upon him be peace, said:
“If you have seen a mosque or heard a call to prayer, then don't kill anybody”.
If the order in one Hadīth was given to refrain from invading altogether, and in the other to refrain from killing anyone, then it would be fair to conclude that no violent war was mandated against a nation if the insignia (Sha'ā'ir) of Islam were allowed to be freely practised therein. Therefore, according to this view, Jihād and Hijrah would only apply where Muslims, or anyone, are being oppressed and brutalised for practising their religion. Hence this debate is far from being a debate over mere terms. It is in this light that al-Imām al-Bujayrimī's above quote should be viewed, for he clearly states that in the Shāfi’ī school a land can be considered Dār al-Islām even if it were handed over by Muslims to non-Muslims for them to rule over,
“...or it was conquered by Muslims who then agreed that non-Muslims would govern over it (Wa Aqarrūha bi Yad il-Kuffār)”.
This is how the matter of defining the terms arose, and thus the legal issue at dispute was: by allowing Muslims to practise their religion do the rulers of such lands where this occurs guarantee their rule? Or does it require more than that to guarantee the continuation of the existent ruler, such as him becoming a Muslim, or his "ruling by the Sharī'ah". Once he became a Muslim, there was another discussion about how to subsequently invalidate his rule, is it by him becoming a disbeliever or merely a transgressor.
Hence, though I have not stated my own preference, this issue is absolutely not one of semantics. The matter of Dār al-Islām used to affect (in the days of expanding Empires) the issue of whether the Muslim army would invade any given land or not i.e. what is the bare minimum expected for such a land to be left alone? Is it just that they allow Muslims to practise their religion? Or is more required, such as the ruler being a Muslim?
It is for this reason that the scholars ('Ulema) of India gave the Fatwa that India was Dār al-Islām under the British, because Muslims were still allowed to practise their religion. Based upon these religious rights the authors of this historic Fatwa accepted co-existence. I state this not to take away the right to resist occupation, rather to show that for some 'Ulema the decision to resist in such circumstances is a strategic and not religious matter.
Another Fatwa in Algeria (1841) ruled by the same thing: here the French general Bugeaud was being fought by a Wahhābite leader by the name of 'abd al-Qādir. 'Abd al-Qādir declared that Muslims must not submit to the rule of disbelievers, and obtained a Fatwa to this effect from Fez. The Sūfi order of Tijāniyyah (who rivalled the Wahhābite 'abd al-Qādir) also sought a Fatwa, which was requested from Qayrawān, the famous religious centre in Tunisia.
The Qayrawān Fatwa declared that, having fought but failed, it was acceptable for Algerians to cease fighting provided that the French promised to allow them to practise their religion and did not dishonour their women. Again, what this Fatwa demonstrates is when a shift occurs from the religious obligation of Jihād to making resistance a strategic decision. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, three of the four Sunni schools of law (Mazāhib) had adopted this view.
(see "Muslims Under non-Muslim Rule by Yahya Michot, foreword by James Piscatori, page xiii.)
(see "Muslims Under non-Muslim Rule by Yahya Michot, foreword by James Piscatori, page xiii.)
Readers may or may not agree with this view, but one thing that cannot be argued is that definition of Dār al-Islām is a semantic issue. Rather, the way in which it is defined affects the minimum threshold from which a jurist would guarantee security to the land's ruler in return for security to practice Islām.
This minimum threshold is the very matter disputed over in the various definitions. Moreover, HT define this issue of minimum threshold (ie: the issue of when the security of a ruler is secured in return for the security of Islam) in an unprecedented way. They insist that for the land to be Dār al-Islām, it must be “ruled by the Sharī'ah” on a state level. Thus, for HT, anything less than that renders the ruler as being removable. However, this is not the same minimum threshold adhered to by other jurists.
If Others are on Valid Legal Opinions (Ijtihādāt) Why Can Hizbut-Tahrir Not Follow its Own Legal Opinion (Ijtihād) Which is also an Islamic Opinion?
A question that is raised by Party activists after hearing the above argument is why, if their view is one amongst many, should they also not be left to practise their opinion. The one who asks this question, however, has failed to grasp the essential point. According to the Party's own thoughts, anyone is perfectly within their rights to hold an Islamic opinion but cannot condemn others who are also on Islamic opinions. The Party may believe what it wishes, but cannot enforce its opinion on others or label other opinions as illegitimate, where the opinion it is trying to remove is also an Islamic one. Party literature states,
“This is because difference of opinion in deduction between the scholars does not make the rule legitimate before a Mujtahid and illegitimate before another. Rather it is a Shari’ah rule before all Muslims as long as there is (even) an obscure evidence (Shubha al-Dalil) from the Shar’iah evidences before the deducer of the rule... ”62
Consequently, if the land is Islamic according to a valid opinion then no misconduct (Munkar) exists in the Muslim world that requires forceful removal. Party members are told by party books that they cannot behave as if other opinions are illegitimate simply because they disagree with them, rather they must recognise them. Therefore, party members must recognise that the lands being Islamic “is a Shari’ah rule before all Muslims”.
Also, in any matter of legal differences of opinion (Ikhtilāf Shari'i) the Party accepts the legal maxim 'the ruler of the land settles disputes' (Amr al-Imām Yarfa'u al-Khilāf). Consequently, once it is accepted that the definitions of Dār al-Islām are differed over, according to this principle the Party believes that all Muslims must abandon their own individual legal opinions (Ijtihādāt) and obey that of the rulers who adopts the one which he sees fit,
“If the Caliph (Khalifah) adopts a hukm which conflicts with the hukm arrived at through his (a scholar's) Ijtihād, then he (the scholar) is obliged to leave the conclusion of his Ijtihād and take the hukm which the Imām (leader) has adopted, because the Ijmā' of the Companions (al- Sahābah) has taken place on the fact that 'the order of the leader (Imām) settles disputes' and that his order is to be implemented on all Muslims.”63
It cannot be said here (though no doubt it will be) that rulers of today are not the true leaders because they rule in Dār al-Kufr and thus they have no authority to adopt on matters of legal difference (Ikhtilāf Shari'i). This cannot be said because it concerns the very topic of debate (Muhall al-Nizā') and is consequently a circular argument. If the very topic itself is subject to a valid dispute then it can only fall to the leader to adopt and thus agreement with the ruler is irrelevant as long as he adopts an Islamic opinion. Moreover, it cannot be asserted that this principle is specific to the Caliph because the maxim in Arabic actually uses the word leader (Imām) and furthermore, the Party considers that the name is interchangeable between Caliph (Khalifah), leader (Imām), President (Ra'is) Prince (Amir), Sultan or anything else that denotes such an authority.64 Consequently, the matter revolves around whether the existent rulers are the authority within Dār al-Islām, and that is the very subject matter that is differed over and is being adopted upon. Consequently, one can believe that the Party's opinion is the strongest Islamic legal opinion (hukm Shari'i), however since those in authority do not hold that opinion, but are on another Islamic opinion, all are bound to follow the leader's adoption. This is because 'the opinion of the leader (Imām) settles disputes' (according to the Party's own thoughts). In this way one can still believe the Party opinion to be the strongest legally, yet is bound not to act on it because the contrary opinion is adopted by the ruler.
In summary, the Party cannot pursue its own opinion because according to its own principles the ruler has the right to adopt from the various opinions, as long as he adopts an Islamic definition. For the Party to insist on following its own opinion and trying to remove a ruler who also adopts a valid definition of Dār al-Islām based on a valid legal reasoning (Ijtihād) is akin to what Ibn Abdul Wahhāb did in the Ottoman Caliphate. The Party criticised Ibn Abdul Wahhāb for pursuing his legal opinion (Ijtihād) that the Ottoman state was upon Kufr because, according to the Party, the Ottomans were also on valid Islamic opinions,
“Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhāb, whose school of thought (Mazhab) had been Hanbali, made Ijtihād (legal judgements) in a host of matters and deemed that the Muslims who followed other schools (Mazahib) differed with his opinion in such matters. Hence, he set about calling for his opinions, working towards implementing them and attacking the other Islamic opinions fiercely...(p.11) they brandished the sword to fight the Muslims and to force them to abandon what they carried in terms of opinions alien to the Wahhābi school (Mazhab), and to adopt the opinions of the Wahhābi school(Mazhab)...”65
One can therefore ask the same question, what was wrong with Ibn Abdul Wahhāb following his valid legal opinion (Ijtihād) to rebel against the Ottoman Caliphate?
Conclusion
To conclude, having shown that the lands are Dār al-Islām according to other criteria, the Party must accept that it cannot enforce its conclusion of Kufr upon valid Islamic opinions. Hizbut-Tahrir is thus faced with two choices: they must either,
i) Accept the lands are Dār al-Islām and go on to insist that there is manifest Kufr (Kufr Buwāh) in the laws of these lands, in which case the Jihadist method is obligated upon them according to the Party's own ideas. The invalidity of this conclusion (again from the Party's own ideas) is the subject of my next article.
ii) Or accept that the lands are Dār al-Islām and that there is no manifest Kufr (Kufr Buwāh) present therein, but rather and at best, a misapplication of the Shari'ah. Hence, political reform is needed by working with the regimes to encourage change, as it was during the last days of the Ottoman Caliphate. This stance accommodates reformists and opposition camps vis-a-vis dictatorships in the Muslim world, and places a civic duty upon all to work for political, intellectual and social reform, but essentially means that the states are not theologically illegitimate and so must not be removed by force.
For the Party to continue upon its path of insisting that even the more representative of Muslim regimes, such as Turkey or Iran, must be removed by force in a military coup de etat is not sustainable by their own theological tenets. There is however, one reason why Hizbut-Tahrir may continue despite its inconsistency with Islam; because Party members may believe in a political ideology irrespective of whether it is consistent with Islam or not, and that ideology is what has come to be known as Islamism. Little wonder then, that they must close the debate on the issue of Dār al-Islām and insist that the matter is self evident regardless of such a clear theological line to the contrary,
“The reality of Muslims today is sensed by every Muslim; it does not require any explanation nor does it necessitate any elaboration. Their lands are ruled by Kufr systems, thus they are conclusively (Qat'an) Dār al-Kufr [with no debate!]”66
Consequently, as some have correctly observed, the tension that exists within Party ranks between its ideology and its politics begins from the Party's very inception. It exists within its raison d'etre.
1 All effort has been made to reference page numbers of citations accurately. Where both the original Arabic and the translation were available, both sets of page numbers have been given. Some page numbers have been taken from electronic copies of the books and this has been clearly indicated. These may not correspond exactly with other electronic versions or hard copies.
2 'The Way For Revival', p..3 (now known as 'The Method of Hizbut-Tahrir for Change' by Hizbut-Tahrir [al-Khilāfah Publications]), corresponding to the Arabic 'Minhāj hizb-ut-Tahrir fi al-Taghyir', p. 6.
3 'The Way For Revival' op.cit., p.2, Arabic p.5.
4 'The Way for Revival', op.cit., p.3, Arabic p. 5.
5 Amān is correctly rendered into English as “safety” not “security”. “Security” is properly known as Aman (without an elongated last vowel ). This subtle translation difference has relevance when considering that the classical definitions of Dār al-Islām mostly hinge upon the issue of “safety” to practice ones religion (Din) and not on the issue of “security” being in the hands of a Muslim army. See note 32 onwards.
6 'The Way for Revival', Ibid.
7 'The Way for Revival' Ibid.
8 'The Way for Revival', p. 5, Arabic p. 7.
9 'The Way for Revival', p6, Arabic p, 8.
10 'Hizbut-Tahrir', by Hizbut-Tahrir (al-Khilāfah publications), p. 10., Arabic p. 5.
11 'The Method to Re-establish the Khilāfah and Resume the Islamic Way of Life', Members of Hizbut-Tahrir in Britain (al-Khilāfah Publications), p. 105.
12 'The Way for Revival', op.cit., p. 38-40, Arabic, p. 44-46
13 'The Method to Re-establish the Khilāfah and Resume the Islamic Way of Life', op.cit., pp. 105-6.
14 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality 'al-Shakhsiyyah al-Islāmiyyah', (al-Khilāfah Publications) as adopted and amended by Hizbut-Tahrir, vol. 2, (electronic) pp. 228, Arabic p. 261
15 'The Way for Revival', op.cit., p21, Arabic p 25.
16 It is important to note here that just as Islamism is not the same as Islam, Jihadism is not the same as Jihad.
17 'Hizbut-Tahrir', op.cit., p. 11, Arabic p. 6.
18 'Hizbut-Tahrir', op.cit., p. 17, Arabic p. 7.
19 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality, op.cit., vol..1 (electronic version) p. 362, Arabic p. 252.
20 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality op.cit., (electronic version) vol. 1 p. 298, Arabic p. 208
21 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality op.cit., vol. 2, (electronic version) p. 105-6, Arabic p. 117.
22 God rest his soul (Rahimahu Allāh)
23 Zalloom, Abdul-Qadeem, How the Khilāfah was Destroyed 'Kayfa Hudimat al-Khilāfah' (al-Khilāfah Publications), p.201. Words in the square brackets are from the Arabic original p. 202
24 See 'The Way for Revival', op.cit., p.4-5, Arabic p. 6-7.
25 A Mutawātir hadith in Party literature is a hadith that affords certain knowledge('Ilm) of its prophetic origins. For such a status to be reached it must have been narrated in each level (Tabaqah) of its narrative chain (Sanad) by a group of people in such a way that it makes it impossible for them to have colluded over its contents. See, al-Nabhāni, Taqi al-Din, The Islamic Personality ' op.cit., as amended and adopted by Hizbut-Tahrir (2005 Edition 6) vol. 3 (electronic) p. 82.
26 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The System of Islām, 'Nizām al-Islām' adopted by Hizbut-Tahrir (al-Khilāfah Publications), (electronic) p. 47, Arabic p. 75
27 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality ', op.cit., as adopted and amended by Hizbut-Tahrir, vol.2, (electronic) p. 218-19, Arabic p. 249. The author expresses disagreement with this opinion by stating, “This opinion is not based upon an evidence;rather it is merely a description of the reality of the land.” This does not mean that he fails to recognise its validity, but rather is expressing his view that he considers it as unsubstantiated by any evidence. He makes similar judgements upon other valid Islamic opinions too, such as his view on the legal principle of 'Juristic Preference' (Istihsān) of the hanafis, where he states that it is “not an Islamic evidence, rather it is ruling (hukm) by a whim, it is abandoning the divine ruling (hukm Shari'i)...but the ruling arrived at by it is considered a divine ruling (hukm Shari'i) because it has a semblance of an evidence (Shubha al-Dalil).” See: The Islamic Personality ', op.cit., vol. 3, (electronic) p. 426.
28 Adopted Party books are those books that are obligatory for a member to believe in and propagate. Members must not openly criticise adopted books even if they disagree with them. Unadopted books are written by Party members or leaders and are not inconsistent with Party adoption, however members are not obliged to believe in their contents.
29 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality ' op.cit., vol. 1, (electronic version) p. 363, Arabic p. 252.
30 See al-Kāsāni, Badā’i‘ al-Sanā'i, vol. 9, p.519, see also Ibn 'Ābidin, al-Hāshiyyah.
31 Special thanks is given to al-Sheikh Shahrul Hussain al-Azhari for his Phd research in this field, and to other friends for their invaluable contribution..
32 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, A River of Recollections 'Nahr al-zikrayāt' (Maktabah al-Turāth al-Islāmiyyah), p170-1, quoting al-Rāfi'i in Fat'h al-'Aziz
33 As per al-Imām al-Shawkāni in 'Nayl al-Awtār', (Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, Beirut), vol. 4, Section 8, page 29, where al-Shawkāni expresses his disagreement with this view.
To conclude, having shown that the lands are Dār al-Islām according to other criteria, the Party must accept that it cannot enforce its conclusion of Kufr upon valid Islamic opinions. Hizbut-Tahrir is thus faced with two choices: they must either,
i) Accept the lands are Dār al-Islām and go on to insist that there is manifest Kufr (Kufr Buwāh) in the laws of these lands, in which case the Jihadist method is obligated upon them according to the Party's own ideas. The invalidity of this conclusion (again from the Party's own ideas) is the subject of my next article.
ii) Or accept that the lands are Dār al-Islām and that there is no manifest Kufr (Kufr Buwāh) present therein, but rather and at best, a misapplication of the Shari'ah. Hence, political reform is needed by working with the regimes to encourage change, as it was during the last days of the Ottoman Caliphate. This stance accommodates reformists and opposition camps vis-a-vis dictatorships in the Muslim world, and places a civic duty upon all to work for political, intellectual and social reform, but essentially means that the states are not theologically illegitimate and so must not be removed by force.
For the Party to continue upon its path of insisting that even the more representative of Muslim regimes, such as Turkey or Iran, must be removed by force in a military coup de etat is not sustainable by their own theological tenets. There is however, one reason why Hizbut-Tahrir may continue despite its inconsistency with Islam; because Party members may believe in a political ideology irrespective of whether it is consistent with Islam or not, and that ideology is what has come to be known as Islamism. Little wonder then, that they must close the debate on the issue of Dār al-Islām and insist that the matter is self evident regardless of such a clear theological line to the contrary,
“The reality of Muslims today is sensed by every Muslim; it does not require any explanation nor does it necessitate any elaboration. Their lands are ruled by Kufr systems, thus they are conclusively (Qat'an) Dār al-Kufr [with no debate!]”66
Consequently, as some have correctly observed, the tension that exists within Party ranks between its ideology and its politics begins from the Party's very inception. It exists within its raison d'etre.
1 All effort has been made to reference page numbers of citations accurately. Where both the original Arabic and the translation were available, both sets of page numbers have been given. Some page numbers have been taken from electronic copies of the books and this has been clearly indicated. These may not correspond exactly with other electronic versions or hard copies.
2 'The Way For Revival', p..3 (now known as 'The Method of Hizbut-Tahrir for Change' by Hizbut-Tahrir [al-Khilāfah Publications]), corresponding to the Arabic 'Minhāj hizb-ut-Tahrir fi al-Taghyir', p. 6.
3 'The Way For Revival' op.cit., p.2, Arabic p.5.
4 'The Way for Revival', op.cit., p.3, Arabic p. 5.
5 Amān is correctly rendered into English as “safety” not “security”. “Security” is properly known as Aman (without an elongated last vowel ). This subtle translation difference has relevance when considering that the classical definitions of Dār al-Islām mostly hinge upon the issue of “safety” to practice ones religion (Din) and not on the issue of “security” being in the hands of a Muslim army. See note 32 onwards.
6 'The Way for Revival', Ibid.
7 'The Way for Revival' Ibid.
8 'The Way for Revival', p. 5, Arabic p. 7.
9 'The Way for Revival', p6, Arabic p, 8.
10 'Hizbut-Tahrir', by Hizbut-Tahrir (al-Khilāfah publications), p. 10., Arabic p. 5.
11 'The Method to Re-establish the Khilāfah and Resume the Islamic Way of Life', Members of Hizbut-Tahrir in Britain (al-Khilāfah Publications), p. 105.
12 'The Way for Revival', op.cit., p. 38-40, Arabic, p. 44-46
13 'The Method to Re-establish the Khilāfah and Resume the Islamic Way of Life', op.cit., pp. 105-6.
14 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality 'al-Shakhsiyyah al-Islāmiyyah', (al-Khilāfah Publications) as adopted and amended by Hizbut-Tahrir, vol. 2, (electronic) pp. 228, Arabic p. 261
15 'The Way for Revival', op.cit., p21, Arabic p 25.
16 It is important to note here that just as Islamism is not the same as Islam, Jihadism is not the same as Jihad.
17 'Hizbut-Tahrir', op.cit., p. 11, Arabic p. 6.
18 'Hizbut-Tahrir', op.cit., p. 17, Arabic p. 7.
19 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality, op.cit., vol..1 (electronic version) p. 362, Arabic p. 252.
20 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality op.cit., (electronic version) vol. 1 p. 298, Arabic p. 208
21 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality op.cit., vol. 2, (electronic version) p. 105-6, Arabic p. 117.
22 God rest his soul (Rahimahu Allāh)
23 Zalloom, Abdul-Qadeem, How the Khilāfah was Destroyed 'Kayfa Hudimat al-Khilāfah' (al-Khilāfah Publications), p.201. Words in the square brackets are from the Arabic original p. 202
24 See 'The Way for Revival', op.cit., p.4-5, Arabic p. 6-7.
25 A Mutawātir hadith in Party literature is a hadith that affords certain knowledge('Ilm) of its prophetic origins. For such a status to be reached it must have been narrated in each level (Tabaqah) of its narrative chain (Sanad) by a group of people in such a way that it makes it impossible for them to have colluded over its contents. See, al-Nabhāni, Taqi al-Din, The Islamic Personality ' op.cit., as amended and adopted by Hizbut-Tahrir (2005 Edition 6) vol. 3 (electronic) p. 82.
26 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The System of Islām, 'Nizām al-Islām' adopted by Hizbut-Tahrir (al-Khilāfah Publications), (electronic) p. 47, Arabic p. 75
27 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality ', op.cit., as adopted and amended by Hizbut-Tahrir, vol.2, (electronic) p. 218-19, Arabic p. 249. The author expresses disagreement with this opinion by stating, “This opinion is not based upon an evidence;rather it is merely a description of the reality of the land.” This does not mean that he fails to recognise its validity, but rather is expressing his view that he considers it as unsubstantiated by any evidence. He makes similar judgements upon other valid Islamic opinions too, such as his view on the legal principle of 'Juristic Preference' (Istihsān) of the hanafis, where he states that it is “not an Islamic evidence, rather it is ruling (hukm) by a whim, it is abandoning the divine ruling (hukm Shari'i)...but the ruling arrived at by it is considered a divine ruling (hukm Shari'i) because it has a semblance of an evidence (Shubha al-Dalil).” See: The Islamic Personality ', op.cit., vol. 3, (electronic) p. 426.
28 Adopted Party books are those books that are obligatory for a member to believe in and propagate. Members must not openly criticise adopted books even if they disagree with them. Unadopted books are written by Party members or leaders and are not inconsistent with Party adoption, however members are not obliged to believe in their contents.
29 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality ' op.cit., vol. 1, (electronic version) p. 363, Arabic p. 252.
30 See al-Kāsāni, Badā’i‘ al-Sanā'i, vol. 9, p.519, see also Ibn 'Ābidin, al-Hāshiyyah.
31 Special thanks is given to al-Sheikh Shahrul Hussain al-Azhari for his Phd research in this field, and to other friends for their invaluable contribution..
32 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, A River of Recollections 'Nahr al-zikrayāt' (Maktabah al-Turāth al-Islāmiyyah), p170-1, quoting al-Rāfi'i in Fat'h al-'Aziz
33 As per al-Imām al-Shawkāni in 'Nayl al-Awtār', (Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, Beirut), vol. 4, Section 8, page 29, where al-Shawkāni expresses his disagreement with this view.
See also: al-Imām al-Māwardi, al-Hāwi al-Kabīr 18 vols. ed. A. M. Mu’awwad and A. A. ‘Abd al-Mawjūd (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-’Ilmiyah, 1414/1994), 14:104.
34 See for the first quote: al-Bujayrimi, Sulaymān, Sharh al-Bujayrimi ‘ala al-Khaţib, edited by Maktab al-Buhūth wa al-Dirasāt, Dār al-Fikr (1998), Beirut; vol. 4, pp. 331-332.
34 See for the first quote: al-Bujayrimi, Sulaymān, Sharh al-Bujayrimi ‘ala al-Khaţib, edited by Maktab al-Buhūth wa al-Dirasāt, Dār al-Fikr (1998), Beirut; vol. 4, pp. 331-332.
See for the second quote: Al-Bujayrimī, Sulaymān, Hāshiyat al- Bujayrimī, 220/4 and Nihāyat al-Muĥtāj, 81/8.
35 Ba’lawi, Abdur-Rahmān, Bughyat al-Mustarshidin fi Talkhis Fatawa ba’d al-Muta’akhkhirin. Bulāq, 1309 H, p. 254
36 al-Ţariqi, al-Isti‘āna, p.170
37 Al-Kāsāni, Badā’i‘, op.cit., vol. 9, p.519
38 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting Abū Yūsuf narrated in al-Mabsūt by al-Sarakhsi.
39 See al-Būţi, Muhammad Sa'id Ramađān, Qađāya Fiqhiyya Mu‘āşarah, (Maktabah al-Fārābi, Damascus 1994) p. 182.
40 Al-Kāsāni, Al-Badā'i’, op. cit. vol. 7, pp. 130-131. See also, Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting al-Kāsāni' narrating Abū hanifah's view in Badā’i‘ al-Sanā'i.
41 Al-Ţariqi, Al-Isti‘āna, op.cit., pp.176-178, Abū Zahra, al-‘Ilāqāt al-Dawliyyah, op.cit., pp. 58-60
42 al-hamid, al-Sheikh Muhammad, Rudūd ‘ala al-abāţil wa al-rasā’il (y44), 2.267-79), as translated by Sheikh Nūh Hā Mim Kellar, Reliance of the Traveller (Amāna Publications), Notes and Appendices p.946. See also al-Kāsāni, Badā’i‘, op.cit., vol. 9, p.519 , Zaidān, Ahkām al-Zimmiyyin, pp.18-19
43 The insignia of Islam are those aspects by which Islam's presence is recognised in any given place, such as the call to prayer or Mosques.
44 al-Dusūqi, Shams al-Din, Hāshiyah al-Dusūqi 'ala al-Sharh al-Kabir (Ihya al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya) vol. 2, p.188.
45 Ibn Muflih, Muhammad, al-Ādāb al-Shar‘iyyah (Mu'assasah al-Risālah) edited by Shu’aib al-Arnauţ and ‘Umr al-Qayyām, Beirut; vol. 1, pp.211-212, 1996
46 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah from 'Ahkām ahl al-Zimmah.'
47 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting Ibn Hazm in al-Muhalla.
48 God rest his soul (Rahimahu Allāh)
49 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting Tuhfah al-Muhtāj by Ibn hajr , Nihāyah al-Muhtaj by al-Ramli and Rawđah al-Ţalibin by al-Nawawi. See also al-Kāsāni, Badā’i‘, op.cit., vol. 9, p.519
50 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting Bada'i al-Sana'i', al-Mughni by Ibn Qadāma and al-Mabsūt by al-Sarakhsi
51 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting Hāshiyyah al-Dusūqi and al-Anwār li A'māl al-Abrār and Nihāyah al-Muhtaj
52 A Fatwa is a legal opinion binding only upon the questioner.
53 See the Fatwa of al-Imām al-Ramli in the notes of al-Fatawi al-Kubra al-Fiqhiyyah by Ibn hajr al-'Asqalāni
54 As related by al-Kāsāni, Badā’i‘, op.cit., vol. 9, p.519
55 Abū Zahra, al-‘Ilāqāt al-Dawliyyah, p. 57
56 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1 quoting Ibn ‘Ābidin from Hāshiyyah Ibn ‘Ābidin
57 al-hamid, al-Sheikh Muhammad, Rudūd ‘ala al-Abāţil wa al-Rasā’il (y44), 2.267-79), as translated by Sheikh Nūh Hā Mim Kellar, Reliance of the Traveller (Amāna Publications), Notes and Appendices, p.946.
58 All brackets are present in original text
59 Ba’lawi, Abdur-Rahmān, Bughyah al-Mustarshidin fi Talkhis Fatawa ba’d al-Muta’akhkhirin. Bulāq, 1309 H, p. 254
60 Al-Akiti, Sheikh Muhammad Afifi, Mudāfi’ al-Mazlūm bi Radd al-Muhāmil ‘ala Qitāl man lā Yuqātil, Question 7. Brackets present in original text.
61 Keller, Nūh Hā Mim, Reliance of the Traveller, op.cit., p. 947.
62 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality 'op.cit., (electronic version) vol. 2, p. 105-6, Arabic p. 117.
63 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality ' op.cit., vol. 1, (electronic version) p. 323-4, Arabic p223-4, See also, The System of Islām, 'Nizām al-Islām' adopted by Hizbut-Tahrir (al-Khilāfah Publications), (electronic) p. 48, addition in square brackets from original Arabic (edition 6 [2006] electronic) p. 76
64 See al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din, 'The Ruling System in Islam', 'Nizām al-hukm fi il-Islām' (al-Khilafāh Publications) as adopted and amended by Hizbut-Tahrir, (electronic) p. 22, Arabic pp. 49-50.
65 Zalloom, Abdul-Qadeem, ‘How the Khilāfah was Destroyed’ op.cit., pp. 6-11.
66 Zalloom, Abdul-Qadeem, ‘How the Khilāfah was Destroyed’, op.cit., p.201, words in square brackets from Arabic original p. 202
35 Ba’lawi, Abdur-Rahmān, Bughyat al-Mustarshidin fi Talkhis Fatawa ba’d al-Muta’akhkhirin. Bulāq, 1309 H, p. 254
36 al-Ţariqi, al-Isti‘āna, p.170
37 Al-Kāsāni, Badā’i‘, op.cit., vol. 9, p.519
38 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting Abū Yūsuf narrated in al-Mabsūt by al-Sarakhsi.
39 See al-Būţi, Muhammad Sa'id Ramađān, Qađāya Fiqhiyya Mu‘āşarah, (Maktabah al-Fārābi, Damascus 1994) p. 182.
40 Al-Kāsāni, Al-Badā'i’, op. cit. vol. 7, pp. 130-131. See also, Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting al-Kāsāni' narrating Abū hanifah's view in Badā’i‘ al-Sanā'i.
41 Al-Ţariqi, Al-Isti‘āna, op.cit., pp.176-178, Abū Zahra, al-‘Ilāqāt al-Dawliyyah, op.cit., pp. 58-60
42 al-hamid, al-Sheikh Muhammad, Rudūd ‘ala al-abāţil wa al-rasā’il (y44), 2.267-79), as translated by Sheikh Nūh Hā Mim Kellar, Reliance of the Traveller (Amāna Publications), Notes and Appendices p.946. See also al-Kāsāni, Badā’i‘, op.cit., vol. 9, p.519 , Zaidān, Ahkām al-Zimmiyyin, pp.18-19
43 The insignia of Islam are those aspects by which Islam's presence is recognised in any given place, such as the call to prayer or Mosques.
44 al-Dusūqi, Shams al-Din, Hāshiyah al-Dusūqi 'ala al-Sharh al-Kabir (Ihya al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya) vol. 2, p.188.
45 Ibn Muflih, Muhammad, al-Ādāb al-Shar‘iyyah (Mu'assasah al-Risālah) edited by Shu’aib al-Arnauţ and ‘Umr al-Qayyām, Beirut; vol. 1, pp.211-212, 1996
46 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah from 'Ahkām ahl al-Zimmah.'
47 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting Ibn Hazm in al-Muhalla.
48 God rest his soul (Rahimahu Allāh)
49 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting Tuhfah al-Muhtāj by Ibn hajr , Nihāyah al-Muhtaj by al-Ramli and Rawđah al-Ţalibin by al-Nawawi. See also al-Kāsāni, Badā’i‘, op.cit., vol. 9, p.519
50 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting Bada'i al-Sana'i', al-Mughni by Ibn Qadāma and al-Mabsūt by al-Sarakhsi
51 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1, quoting Hāshiyyah al-Dusūqi and al-Anwār li A'māl al-Abrār and Nihāyah al-Muhtaj
52 A Fatwa is a legal opinion binding only upon the questioner.
53 See the Fatwa of al-Imām al-Ramli in the notes of al-Fatawi al-Kubra al-Fiqhiyyah by Ibn hajr al-'Asqalāni
54 As related by al-Kāsāni, Badā’i‘, op.cit., vol. 9, p.519
55 Abū Zahra, al-‘Ilāqāt al-Dawliyyah, p. 57
56 Ibrāhim, Nājih., et al, op.cit., p170-1 quoting Ibn ‘Ābidin from Hāshiyyah Ibn ‘Ābidin
57 al-hamid, al-Sheikh Muhammad, Rudūd ‘ala al-Abāţil wa al-Rasā’il (y44), 2.267-79), as translated by Sheikh Nūh Hā Mim Kellar, Reliance of the Traveller (Amāna Publications), Notes and Appendices, p.946.
58 All brackets are present in original text
59 Ba’lawi, Abdur-Rahmān, Bughyah al-Mustarshidin fi Talkhis Fatawa ba’d al-Muta’akhkhirin. Bulāq, 1309 H, p. 254
60 Al-Akiti, Sheikh Muhammad Afifi, Mudāfi’ al-Mazlūm bi Radd al-Muhāmil ‘ala Qitāl man lā Yuqātil, Question 7. Brackets present in original text.
61 Keller, Nūh Hā Mim, Reliance of the Traveller, op.cit., p. 947.
62 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality 'op.cit., (electronic version) vol. 2, p. 105-6, Arabic p. 117.
63 al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din., The Islamic Personality ' op.cit., vol. 1, (electronic version) p. 323-4, Arabic p223-4, See also, The System of Islām, 'Nizām al-Islām' adopted by Hizbut-Tahrir (al-Khilāfah Publications), (electronic) p. 48, addition in square brackets from original Arabic (edition 6 [2006] electronic) p. 76
64 See al-Nabhāni, Taqi ud-Din, 'The Ruling System in Islam', 'Nizām al-hukm fi il-Islām' (al-Khilafāh Publications) as adopted and amended by Hizbut-Tahrir, (electronic) p. 22, Arabic pp. 49-50.
65 Zalloom, Abdul-Qadeem, ‘How the Khilāfah was Destroyed’ op.cit., pp. 6-11.
66 Zalloom, Abdul-Qadeem, ‘How the Khilāfah was Destroyed’, op.cit., p.201, words in square brackets from Arabic original p. 202
